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Abstract—Pervasive social networks extend traditional social
networking by enabling users to share information in a peer-
to-peer fashion using their wireless mobile devices. Contrary to
traditional online social networks, privacy protection in such
networks depends heavily on users’ context (time, location,
activity, etc.) and their sensitivity to the shared data and
context. Existing privacy-preserving mechanisms do not adapt
well to different data, context and user sensitivities. In this
work, we follow a fresh approach for privacy preservation,
called privacy-triggered communications; it allows users in such
pervasive networks to dynamically regulate their communi-
cations based on their context and on the evolution of their
privacy in that context. Our initial results show that this is a
feasible strategy for privacy management in pervasive social
networking scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless peer-to-peer communications using WiFi or
Bluetooth has been a popular way for mobile phone users
to exchange information with other devices in the neigh-
borhood. Recently, Nokia has also introduced Nokia Instant
Community (NIC) [1], a platform for power-efficient and
always-on device-to-device messaging which uses wireless,
ad-hoc, IEEE 802.11 connections to seamlessly carry small-
sized local contextual information between devices. Such
wireless peer-to-peer networks, referred by us as pervasive
social networks, enable a wide array of context-aware appli-
cations such as local-area social networking [2], dating [3],
personal safety [4] and micro-blogging [5].
Location privacy concerns in social networking applica-
tions have been growing and users are increasingly becoming
privacy-aware, as shown by a recent survey [6]. The success
of these upcoming pervasive social networking platforms
will depend on the efficiency and simplicity of the privacy-
preservation mechanisms. Sharing data locally in a peer-
to-peer fashion avoids the privacy issues resulting from
information revelation to untrusted third-parties, but leaks
personal information to wireless eavesdroppers. In particular,
by overhearing the content and pattern of communications
between mobile devices, it may be possible to identify and
track their owners. Various approaches have been proposed
to address the location privacy issues in infrastructure-
based and wireless peer-to-peer networks. Some popular
solutions propose to remove identifiers [7] from exchanged
messages or to change them over time [8], [9] in order
to prevent an adversary from linking data to users. Others
rely on cryptographically secure authentication techniques,
such as group signatures, anonymous credentials and secret
handshakes, to authenticate and/or encrypt communications.
One limitation of these approaches is that, in addition to
being heavy, they do not consider factors such as the device
context and users’ sensitivity to privacy and shared content,
which is crucial in pervasive systems. For example, a user
may not require the same privacy at his home as compared to
his office. Similarly, stricter anonymization is needed while
sharing sensitive data as compared to public information.
In addition, source and destination identifiers are generally
not encrypted for ease of message routing. Other techniques
such as identifier removal and/or changes are ineffective
against privacy leakage due to message context.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach that allows
users to dynamically fine tune their privacy requirements
in order to control their participation in pervasive social
networks. Our approach, called privacy-triggered commu-
nications, enables users to make communication decisions
based on their current privacy level, the content of commu-
nications and the current context. In contrast with existing
approaches, users can automatically regulate what they share
with others by making dynamic privacy-based decisions as
they move in the network. More specifically, users’ mobile
devices identify appropriate moments to share data with
nearby nodes: for example, share intimate data only when
their privacy level is sufficiently high. An analogy can be
drawn here to a password strength indicator tool, which
provides a visual indication of the strength of the password
chosen by the user. Our proposed approach is similar; users
are provided with a view of how good their current privacy
is, which they then use to regulate their communications.
We propose mechanisms for effective privacy-dependent
message triggering in pervasive communication systems.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In pervasive social networks, users exchange information,
based on relationship, interests, affiliations and context, with
other co-located users using their mobile devices in a peer-
to-peer wireless fashion (e.g., WiFi or Bluetooth). Such com-
munications are analogous to chatting on a public Internet
forum, but happen independently of any infrastructure or
chat server. As a result, they complement infrastructure-
based communications using cellular or WLAN. We assume
that communications are either non-interactive or interac-
tive. In non-interactive communications, a user broadcasts
information without any specific request from other users,
for example, airing a point-of-view at a political rally.
Whereas, in interactive communications, users multicast
relevant information only in response to specific queries
from other users, for example, sending local restaurant
recommendations to nearby requesting users. The wireless
ad-hoc interface of the devices possess a smart and efficient
beaconing mechanism [10] for neighborhood discovery;
there are provisions in the standard such that a group of
ad-hoc devices in the vicinity of each other, can efficiently
distribute the beaconing task uniformly within the group. We
assume that any communication consists of: 1) an identifier
or pseudonym (e.g., MAC address) belonging to the message
originator and 2) the message itself in encrypted or unen-
crypted form, depending on whether the communication is
private or public, respectively. If the message is not public,
identifying information of the target user(s) is also included.
To prevent trivial tracking and message linking to users, we
assume that device identifiers or pseudonyms are regularly
changed at pre-defined intervals. Similarly, user security
credentials are also regularly updated.
III. PRIVACY THREATS
In this work, we focus mainly on location privacy threats
due to an eavesdropping adversary (can be a legitimate
node) whose goal is to identify and track users based
on the observed communications. By collecting messages
together with their location, the adversary will try to obtain
the true identity of the device owner from an analysis of
pseudonymous location traces [8]. This can also be used to
link past communications to specific users. Users require
source anonymity, i.e., they do not want eavesdroppers to
learn that a particular message comes from a specific user.
For example, participants at a political rally may not want
the government to figure that a particular, possibly anti-
government, message came from a specific user. By observ-
ing the exchanged messages, the adversary also attempts
to learn sensitive information about users and their social
networks, for example, association with particular religious
or political groups. The strength of the adversary depends
on the means available to him, i.e., he can be a local
eavesdropper with a single radio or a more sophisticated
one with multiple sensing stations. We assume that factors
such as user mobility, multi-path fading and interference will
provide enough radio signal uncertainty to prevent physical
layer identification attacks. We assume that security and
integrity of data, especially in private communities, can be
addressed using appropriate cryptographic measures.
IV. PRIVACY-TRIGGERED COMMUNICATIONS
We implement our privacy-triggered networking concept
as a privacy-wrapper (middle-ware) composed of a set
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Figure 1. Privacy-wrapper (a) Conceptual view, (b) Architecture
of cross-layer libraries (Fig. 1 (a)). The privacy-wrapper
can be utilized by any wireless peer-to-peer application
through an API. The privacy-wrapper continuously monitors
communications from the device and its neighborhood, and
it dynamically determines whether the context provides
enough privacy for users to share their information. In other
words, the context and its associated privacy level act as a
trigger for the networking activity of nodes.
Privacy policies and controls can also be implemented as
user-friendly policy management tools [11] or as operating
system-level libraries [12]. The approaches proposed in [11]
are too application-specific whereas the approach in [12],
contrary to ours, focuses on enforcing a system-wide privacy
policy by placing privacy-related controls in the operating
system. Instead, our approach focuses on providing dynamic,
application-independent privacy controls to the users, which
would enable them to regulate their participation in pervasive
social networks. Our approach consists of three parts: 1)
privacy measurement, 2) capturing user sensitivity, and 3)
privacy-based communication triggering.
A. Measuring Privacy
Before enabling privacy-based communication decisions,
it is essential to accurately quantify user location privacy.
In the context of pervasive social networks, users should
be able to measure how identifiable and traceable they are
based on their communications. One commonly used metric
for measuring anonymity in pseudonymous communications
is k-anonymity [13]. A user is k-anonymous if a passive
adversary is unable to distinguish communications of the
user in question from at least k−1 other users (called user’s
anonymity set). Other metrics for measuring privacy can
also be used. For example, Diaz et al. [14] and Serjantov et
al. [15] propose a privacy metric based on the entropy of the
anonymity set of the message originator. Similarly, there are
other metrics that measure the adversary’s error in correctly
identifying users’ events [16] or that measure the extent to
which a user can be tracked with high certainty [17].
Our approach of privacy-triggered communications is not
restricted to any specific privacy metric(s); system design-
ers should employ a metric that is simple, reflects users’
intuition of privacy and effectively protects against the
assumed adversary. Currently, we have implemented the
standard k-anonymity metric that measures privacy using
the neighborhood density of the device. We capture the
strength of the adversary by measuring the maximum dis-
tance between the device and its neighbors, called confusion
distance; more packed a neighborhood, more difficult it is
to differentiate users from each other. In this way, we are
able to capture both the user’s anonymity set as well as the
difficulty of the adversary in distinguishing the user from
others in its anonymity set. One drawback of such a simple
metric is that an adversary can easily have k devices in
the neighborhood of a user in order to track him. In order
to overcome such problems, a more sophisticated metric,
which takes into account other neighborhood parameters
and complex adversarial strategies can also be used. Trivial
attacks, such as the one above, can be thwarted by a dynamic
k value (unknown to the adversary) chosen based on the user
sensitivity as discussed next.
B. User Sensitivity
Privacy metrics, by themselves, do not capture the sensi-
tivity of a user to a given context and to the network observ-
ables in that context. For example, in a known environment
(e.g., office), a given neighborhood density context may be
considered as high privacy, whereas a similar density in an
unknown environment may be considered as low privacy
by the same user. Dey et al. [18] defined context as “any
information that can be used to characterize the situation
of an entity, where an entity is a person, place, or object
that is considered relevant to the interaction between a user
and an application, including the user and the application
themselves. Context is typically the location, identity and
state of people, groups and computational and physical
objects”. Determining and managing user sensitivities to the
various external contexts in pervasive environments is non-
trivial. There are two approaches that can be followed for
this, namely manual and automatic. In manual approaches,
users can create and customize profiles, one for each sig-
nificant context, that captures their privacy sensitivity in
that context. A profile can contain, in addition to context
information such as location, time, etc., privacy metric
parameters such as the required minimum and maximum
anonymity set sizes and minimum and maximum confusion
distances. Due to the difficulty in accurately estimating the
privacy parameters for a context, sensitivity profiles can also
be alternatively expressed as preferred locations or points-
of-interest [19]. Network parameters can then be extracted
from these locations and used as a baseline during privacy
computation. After creation of profile(s), users manually
choose the sensitivity profile that best matches his current
context (or is most appropriate for current communications).
The system dynamically adjusts or scales the users’ privacy
level based on the chosen profile. One drawback of the
manual approach is that profile management can become
cumbersome leading to usability issues. Alternatively, the
process of user sensitivity determination can be partially
automated. Users are provided with a fixed set of cus-
tomizable sensitivity profiles. Based on the current device
context (e.g., location, neighborhood), an appropriate profile
is automatically chosen by the system. Automation improves
usability, but it is risky as erroneous observations can result
in the selection of incorrect profiles.
C. Privacy-Triggering Mechanisms
We propose two mechanisms for triggering communica-
tions based on privacy.
1) Threshold-based Technique: In the threshold-based
technique (Algorithm 1), users assign privacy and time
validity thresholds to their communications. The privacy
threshold indicates the minimum level of privacy required by
the user before that communication can be broadcast on the
network whereas the time validity threshold gives the time
period after which the communication is no longer valid (or
significant). Unless the privacy threshold is met, the commu-
nication is not sent out on the network; it is instead queued
in a local message buffer (B). Buffered communications that
are still valid are immediately scheduled for delivery when
the corresponding privacy threshold is met by the user.
Algorithm 1: Threshold-based algorithm
Data: d(t): user privacy at t, db: min. reqd. privacy for msg
b, tb: validity period for msg b.
for every time instant tcur do
while B is not empty do
for each b ∈ B do
if d(tcur) ≥ db then
if tcur ≤ tb then
Schedule b for delivery;
else
Delete b from B;
end
end
end
end
end
2) Probabilistic Technique: Although the threshold-based
approach is simple, it is restrictive as it would be difficult for
users to decide a value for the privacy threshold; the thresh-
old may change depending on users future states in terms of
privacy and communications. The threshold-based approach
does not take into account the past states of the user and
also the possible future states, before making communication
decisions. For example, users can be identified based on the
messages that are transmitted often due to lower privacy
requirements, which is not good for subsequent messages
that require higher privacy.
In order to overcome these problems, we also propose a
probabilistic technique for privacy-triggering. Similar to the
threshold-based technique, the device consists of a message
buffer holding a fixed number of messages that need to
be communicated based on privacy and the probabilistic
technique is implemented as a decision mechanism in the
middle-ware. At each time instant, the middle-ware is con-
sulted to determine the message(s) (from the buffer) that
can be forwarded in that time instant. This message(s) is
chosen based on the optimal policy computation by the
decision mechanism of the middle-ware. A policy decides
which messages in the buffer are forwarded at each time
instant. An optimal policy maximizes the overall utility or
reward of the device (user) for forwarding messages.
The device (user) location privacy in a pervasive social
network is stochastic in nature as it depends on non-
deterministic factors such as user context, user mobility and
the mobility, activity and context of the device neighbor-
hood. Thus, the system’s privacy evolution can be modeled
as a stochastic process, such as a discrete time process. Let
B = {b1, b2, . . . , bn} be the n messages in the device buffer.
Let s ∈ S represent the state of a device at any time instant.
The state of a device is represented in terms of its privacy
and other factors (e.g., remaining energy). The objective is
to determine an optimal policy µ∗(s) that, as a function of
the current device state, determines a message (or a set of
messages) b ∈ P(B)1 that can be forwarded in that state.
Assuming that time is divided into discrete time intervals,
an optimal policy can be evaluated at the beginning of fixed
time slots to determine the message(s) to be forwarded in
that time slot. At each such decision epoch, a decision is
consulted by the device from the privacy-triggering middle-
ware system. The middle-ware determines message(s) that,
if communicated in the current time epoch, would maximize
an overall discounted reward for the user.
We now characterize a device’s state in terms of its privacy
in the environment. As discussed in Section IV-A, there
are various metrics for quantifying location privacy in a
pseudonymous wireless peer-to-peer network. Let us assume
that the device privacy d ∈ [dmin, dmax] can be measured
through active measurements on the device’s wireless peer-
to-peer interface using one of the metrics mentioned in Sec-
tion IV-A. We can map the range of the privacy values of the
device as a set of quantized states Sd = {sd1 , sd2 . . . sdJ}.
Similarly, let So = {so1 , so2 . . . soL} represent the states
based on the quantized values of some other significant
device parameters, for example remaining energy of the
device. Then, the set of all possible device states S can
be represented as S = Sd × So.
The variations in the measured device privacy depends
1P(B) is the powerset of B
on various factors such as the privacy metric, device mo-
bility, device neighborhood dynamism, users’ context and
sensitivity to specific contexts and current device message
traffic. Similarly, other variations such as device energy
would depend on device usage. We capture these variations
in device states using a finite-state Markov chain model as
follows. Let pi,j denote the probability to transition from
state si ∈ S to state sj ∈ S at time instant t:
pi,j = P (s(t+ 1) = sj |s(t) = si)
where, s(t) denotes the state of the device at time instant
t. Thus, we can define the state transition matrix as M =
[(pi,j)] and the corresponding transition equation as
p˜(t+ 1) = p˜(t) ·M
where, p˜(t) represents the probability vector over the entire
state space S at the time instant t.
The forwarded message(s) b ⊆ B in each time instant
affects the privacy (or other factors such as energy) of the
device, thus taking it from the current state to some other
state. In other words, the action2 b chosen by the system will
modify the dynamic system and these state transitions can be
represented by a controlled Markov chain model M(b), b ⊆
B (or b ∈ P(B)). The transition probability pi,j(b) of M(b)
represents the probability of transiting from state si to state
sj provided action b has been taken in si, i.e., message(s) b
has been forwarded in state si.
After defining the Markov model on the finite state space
S and the finite action space P(B) of the device, we can now
formulate the decision control problem of choosing optimal
actions (or messages to be forwarded) as a Markov Decision
Process (MDP). In order to do that, we first need to define
a reward function. We define a real-valued reward function
R : S×P(B)→ R, defined over the set space S and action
space P(B), which quantifies the preference or utility (of the
user) obtained by taking action b (in this case, forwarding
messages b) when the device is in the (privacy) state s.
Let Xt and ∆t be the random variables denoting the de-
vice state and the action chosen at time period t, respectively.
Now, for any stationary policy µ, initial state s and the
reward function R, the total reward Vµ(s) is given as:
Vµ(s) =
N−1∑
t=0
βt · Eµ,s{R(Xt,∆t)} (1)
where, Eµ,s{R(Xt,∆t)} is expected reward corresponding
to the stochastic process {Xt,∆t, t ≥ 0}, β ∈ (0, 1] is
the discount factor over future decisions and N is the finite
horizon. We assume the stationarity of policies over the finite
horizon N . N can be a fixed time period, say from 9 a.m.
in the morning to 9 p.m. in the evening.
2Readers should note that as the buffer is finite, the action space of the
system is also finite
We then define the optimal value function for the dis-
counted expected total reward as
V (s) = sup
µ∈Π
Vµ(s), s ∈ S (2)
where, Π is the set of all possible policies. In other words,
V (s) is the best reward one can achieve from an initial state
s, with a discount factor β when there remain N horizons.
Any policy µ∗ is optimal if Vµ∗(s) = V (s) for all s ∈
S. Now, if Vµ(s) is well-defined (and finite) for all µ and
all s ∈ S, then the optimal value function (2) is a unique
solution of the optimality equation (3), also referred as the
Bellman’s equation, under certain conditions [20].
V (si) = sup
b
{R(sj , b) + β
∑
sj
pi,j(b) · V (sj)}, si ∈ S (3)
Thus, in order to determine the optimal policy (or messages
to be forwarded in each time instant), we need to solve
the finite discounted reward problem, as described by the
optimality equation in (3). There are various techniques
for solving the optimality equation. We use a dynamic
programming-based approach, called the Value Iteration
Algorithm, as outlined below.
Algorithm 2: Value Iteration Algorithm
V (s)← 0 ∀s ∈ S;
δ ← 0;
repeat
foreach s ∈ S do
v ← V (s);
foreach b ∈ P(B) do
Q(s, b)← R(s, b)+β∑s′∈S V (s′)·M(b)[s, s′];
end
V (s)← maxb Q(s, b);
δ ← max{δ, |v − V (s)|};
end
until δ < φ;
for s ∈ S do
µ∗(s)← arg maxb Q(s, b)
end
The parameter φ in the terminating condition of Algorithm
2 is a system-defined constant. The value iteration algo-
rithm is executed and updated periodically by the privacy-
triggering middle-ware in order to evaluate the optimal
control policy µ∗ for forwarding messages. The messages
selected by the optimal policy (in the current state) are
then forwarded by the device. The MDP invocation on the
devices has to be preceded by a training or learning
phase. During the training phase, the state transition matrix
M(b) is evaluated by monitoring the system state transitions
associated with the forwarded messages for different device
contexts such as time, location, day-of-week, etc. We can
observe that the proposed approach evaluates an optimal
policy for all states s ∈ S, and thus the larger the total
number of states and the set of all possible actions in those
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Figure 2. (a) Prototype, (b) Simulation results: Average delay (red) and
displacement (blue)
states, the slower will be the evaluation of the optimal policy.
The feasibility of the proposed approach clearly depends on
how the system privacy states are quantified and the size of
the message buffer.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented the concept of privacy-triggered
communications for NIC enabled Nokia N810 mobile de-
vices. The overall system architecture is shown in Fig. 1(b).
Applications developed on top of NIC, for example chat,
messaging, file sharing, etc., send data to and receive data
from neighboring NIC devices on the wireless ad-hoc in-
terface. The NIC platform provides basic user management,
community management and communication primitives. Our
implementation focuses on development of privacy mea-
surement mechanisms (data analyzer and privacy calcula-
tor in Fig. 1(b)), privacy visualization and privacy control
tools (privacy visualizer in Fig. 1(b)) and privacy-triggering
mechanisms (message controller in Fig. 1(b)). Fig. 2(a)
shows a screen-shot of our prototype application on Nokia
N810. We have currently implemented privacy-triggered
communications as an extension to a simple NIC-based peer-
to-peer chat application. This can be easily extended to all
applications using NIC. The application consists of a privacy
meter, which displays the current level of user privacy in
the pervasive environment. A user-context choice control
can be used by the user to select and customize a profile
that best matches his current context sensitivity. A slider
control can be used to select the minimum privacy level
required (compared to the existing level) for the upcoming
communications. Currently, we have implemented only the
threshold-based technique for privacy-triggered communica-
tions. In this case, if the required privacy for a message is
higher than the current privacy level, it is locally buffered
until sufficient privacy is available. Otherwise, messages are
sent out on the network immediately.
Our goal in this work is to verify if privacy-triggered
communications are feasible and effective for protecting user
privacy in upcoming pervasive social networking platforms
such as NIC. We plan to do that by deploying around 100
NIC enabled mobile phones on the EPFL campus, which will
be carried by students for a period of 3 months. During this
period, we will test the usability and effectiveness of privacy-
triggered communications in preserving user anonymity for
certain communications, as well as the effect of privacy-
triggering on the overall Quality-of-Service (QoS).
We prepare for such a large-scale deployment by first
carrying out simulation experiments. We simulate the move-
ment and privacy-triggered peer-to-peer communications of
100 mobile devices equipped with 914MHz wireless radios
moving along the streets of a 1km × 1km city block at
pedestrian speeds (< 3km/h). We implement the threshold-
based approach with k-neighborhood as the privacy metric.
Simulation results (Fig. 2b) are as expected and show that
the average delay and displacement of communications due
to privacy-triggering decreases as confusion distance in-
creases, given a privacy threshold of 6 neighboring devices.
Interestingly, a confusion distance of 100m, results in an
average communication delay of around 3 min. and an aver-
age communication displacement of roughly 75m, which is
reasonable for most social communications. An interesting
observation is that places with higher user density (e.g.,
Points of Interest or POI) had higher communication rates.
POI’s provide good mixing and are suitable for anonymous
peer-to-peer communications. A side-effect of this is that
communications become bursty, leading to higher congestion
within and near POIs. This also implies that users share lots
of data all at once, which is not good. As expected, we can
see that privacy comes at the price of a lower QoS. By means
of appropriate tools and mechanisms, our goal is to enable
users to make their own choice in this regard. Those who
prefer high privacy can have it, but at the cost of a lower
QoS.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We introduced privacy-triggered communications as a
novel technique for privacy-preservation in an upcoming
class of social networks called pervasive social networks.
Privacy-triggered communications allow users in such net-
works to dynamically regulate their participation based on
their privacy. This work is a first step towards providing
tools that consider the wireless context of the users in
order to control their privacy. We feel that the successful
adoption of pervasive social networks will depend on the
ability of the system to accurately capture users’ privacy
requirements in different environments and contexts. As part
of ongoing work, we plan to implement the probabilistic
technique for privacy-triggering and other metrics for pri-
vacy measurement. These efforts will take advantage of the
real-life mobility and human-behavior data available from
the planned on-campus trial.
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